The influence of audit committee characteristics on real

earnings management by FUAD, Fuad
11/27/2018 Turnitin Originality Report
https://www.turnitin.com/newreport_printview.asp?eq=0&eb=0&esm=25&oid=1044907187&sid=0&n=0&m=0&svr=335&r=37.67382198434006&l… 1/17
C10_The_Influence_of_Audit.pdf by
Anonymous
From Quick Submit (Quick Submit)
Processed on 26-Nov-2018 20:00 WIB
ID: 1044907187
Word Count: 6518
 
Similarity Index
15%
Internet Sources: 15%
Publications: 17%
Student Papers: N/A
Similarity by Source
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
 Turnitin Originality Report
sources:
1% match (Internet from 11-Oct-2018)
https://ejournal.undip.ac.id/index.php/akuditi/rt/captureCite/13868/0/MlaCitationPlugin
1% match (publications)
I. Putu Sugiartha Sanjaya, Andreas Yudha Mahendra Jati. "Chapter 12 Characteristics of Audit
Committee and Real Activities Manipulation: Case from Indonesia", Springer Nature, 2015
1% match (Internet from 11-Apr-2010)
http://www.maref.org.my/research/completed_research_doc/Dr_Nurwati_Ashikin-
Corporate_Boards.pdf
1% match (Internet from 04-Mar-2018)
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/full/10.1108/IJLMA-01-2015-0006
1% match (Internet from 04-Sep-2018)
https://pt.scribd.com/document/328900030/20160813-FA-IDX-AR-2015-pdf
1% match (publications)
Amina Zgarni, Hassouna Fadhila, Moez El Gaied. "Audit Committee and Discretionary Loan
Loss Provisions in Tunisian Commercial Banks", International Journal of Business and
Management, 2018
1% match (Internet from 15-Mar-2010)
http://www.business.uiuc.edu/accountancy/events/symposium/audit/proceedings/proceedings_2008/Papers/Carcello.p
1% match (publications)
Abdul Ghofar, Sardar M.N. Islam. "Corporate Governance and Contingency Theory", Springer
Nature America, Inc, 2015
1% match (publications)
Ayub Wijayati Sapta Pradana, Hariri Hariri, Junaidi Junaidi. "Market Discipline Mechanism: A
Quantitative Approach (The Study of Islamic Banking in Indonesia 2011-2014)", JEMA: Jurnal
Ilmiah Bidang Akuntansi dan Manajemen, 2017
1% match (Internet from 25-Aug-2014)
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/448/1/FINAL_WHOLE_PHD_pdf.pdf?DDD2+
1% match (Internet from 13-Apr-2016)
http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/4308/1/PhD%20Thesis%20%282013%29%20-
%20Chaudhry%20Mohammed%20Ghafran.pdf
1% match (Internet from 20-Sep-2015)
http://e-journal.uajy.ac.id/6169/1/KARYA%20ILMIAH.pdf
11/27/2018 Turnitin Originality Report
https://www.turnitin.com/newreport_printview.asp?eq=0&eb=0&esm=25&oid=1044907187&sid=0&n=0&m=0&svr=335&r=37.67382198434006&l… 2/17
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
< 1% match (Internet from 05-Dec-2017)
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281749614_Audit_C
< 1% match (Internet from 11-Nov-2015)
http://www.globalraf.com/static/documents/March/2014/7.%20Chi-Sien.pdf
< 1% match (Internet from 20-Aug-2018)
http://www.isihome.ir/freearticle/ISIHome.ir-24026.pdf
< 1% match (Internet from 10-Jul-2018)
http://iiste.org/Journals/index.php/RJFA/article/viewFile/32732/33622
< 1% match (Internet from 05-Mar-2010)
http://www.civils.org.za/Portals/0/pdf/journal/vol47-2-2005/vol47_n2_a.pdf
< 1% match (publications)
Mingzhi Liu, Yulin Shi, Craig Wilson, Zhenyu Wu. "Does family involvement explain why
corporate social responsibility affects earnings management?", Journal of Business Research,
2017
< 1% match (Internet from 26-Oct-2017)
http://staff.uny.ac.id/sites/default/files/penelitian/Dr.%20Ratna%20Candra%20Sari,%20SE.,%20M.Si,%20Akt/Proceedi
Book%204A%20Turky.pdf
< 1% match (publications)
Lidya Primta Surbakti, Hasnah Binti Shaari, Hasan Mohammed Ahmed Bamahros. "Effect of
Audit Committee Expertise and Meeting on Earnings Quality in Indonesian Listed Companies:
A Conceptual Approach", Journal of Accounting and Finance in Emerging Economies, 2017
< 1% match (Internet from 13-Sep-2018)
https://ejournal3.undip.ac.id/index.php/accounting/article/view/16309
< 1% match (Internet from 17-Oct-2014)
http://www.scientificpapers.org/wp-content/files/Issue_1_-_vol_II_-_online.pdf
< 1% match (Internet from 13-Mar-2017)
http://www.virtusinterpress.org/IMG/pdf/COC__Volume_13_Issue_4_Summer_2016_Continued4_.pdf
< 1% match (Internet from 02-Feb-2016)
http://cluteinstitute.com/ojs/index.php/JABR/article/download/9147/9153
< 1% match (Internet from 22-Nov-2013)
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.202.2393&rep=rep1&type=pdf
< 1% match (Internet from 13-Apr-2016)
http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/4876/1/Thesis_M.M.S%20Alhadab.pdf
< 1% match (Internet from 10-Oct-2018)
https://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/full/10.1108/10309611111148779
11/27/2018 Turnitin Originality Report
https://www.turnitin.com/newreport_printview.asp?eq=0&eb=0&esm=25&oid=1044907187&sid=0&n=0&m=0&svr=335&r=37.67382198434006&l… 3/17
28 < 1% match (publications)
Gopal Krishnan, Gnanakumar Visvanathan. "Do Auditors Price Audit Committee's Expertise?
The Case of Accounting versus Nonaccounting Financial Experts", Journal of Accounting,
Auditing & Finance, 2009
paper text:
1THE INFLUENCE OF AUDIT COMMITTEE CHARACTERISTICS ON REAL
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
Supriyaningsih, Fuad1
1Department of Accounting, Faculty of Economics and Business Diponegoro
University, Jl. Prof. Soedharto SH
TembalangSemarang, Indonesia 50239. Phone: +622476486851 ABSTRACT Current study tests the impact
of audit committees to the real earnings management.Using the manufacturing public listed companies from
Indoensia Stock Exchange from 2012 until 2014, we found that that
22financial and accounting expertise of audit committee members and audit
committee
size have positive effect on real earnings management. Furthermore, we also
8found that the dual positions of the audit committee chairman have a negative
effect on earnings management. The Tenure of audit committee chairman however, has no impact on real
earnings management. Keywords: real earnings management, characteristics of audit committee, good
corporate governance, agency theory. INTRODUCTION Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) has required all
listed companies to implement good corporate governance. This is because the good corporate governance
is a tool to connect the company management with board of directors and stakeholders. Based on this,
Indonesia Stock Exchange issued a regulation No: Kep-315 / BEJ / 06 / -2000 enhanced with regulations No
.: Kep-339 / BEJ / 07 / -2001 on July 1, 2001 related to the establishment of an audit committee,
independent commissioner and board secretary of listed companies. Indonesia Stock Exchange reconfirmed
the rules with the issuance of Bapepam Chairman Decree No .: Kep-29 / PM / 2004, in which the contents of
the decision requires companies listed on the Stock Exchange to have an audit committee. The regulations
require a minimum of three independent people who make up the audit committee. One of the three
members is from an independent commissioner who will be the chairman of the audit committee. In addition,
one of the three members must have expertise and capabilities in the field of accounting and finance. With
three members, the board formed an audit committee in order to assist the 1Corresponding author
commissioners in their duties. The audit subsidies from the government committee has a role in helping
(Subramanyam and Wild, 2013). commissioners in overseeing the Earnings management can be
management doing the financial reporting categorized into the accrual earnings process. The role makes the
audit committee management and real earnings management, is often linked to the quality of financial based
on whether or not to have a direct reporting. The existence of the audit impact on cash flow. Accrual
management committee should be able to improve the earnings are earnings manipulation using quality of
financial reporting and company's methods and accounting estimates that are internal control quality that
aims to provide not a direct impact on cash flow. Instead, the protection to shareholders. real earnings
management is earnings Nevertheless, within the last ten manipulation using operational activities years
many scandals appeared related to that directly affect to the cash flow. Real financial reporting. That makes
the earnings management is known in the post effectiveness of audit committees in Sarbanes Oxley Act
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(SOX) period. overseeing the financial reporting process in Compared by accrual earnings management, the
company was often questioned (Vafeas real earnings management has received little in Putri, 2011). The
collapse of several large attention in the research literature. companies that never happened raises
Therefore, this study focuses on real questions related to supervision by the board earnings management. of
directors and the audit committee due to Roychowdhury (2006) the manipulation of doing accounting
comprehensively investigate earnings records. Those manipulation activities are management through real
activities. known as earnings management (earnings According to Roychowdhury (2006) management).
earnings management through real activities According to Schipper (1989), is activity originating from
normal earnings management is interference in the operational practices, which encouraged determination
of earnings that is done manager desire to mislead some deliberately for personal gain. Earnings
stakeholders as a general statement users management can occur for several reasons, into believing that
certain financial reporting such as to increase the manager purposes has been fulfilled in a credible form
compensation, boost stock prices, and get of operational operation. Research results show that managers
typically take three TSHupErIiNyaFnLiUnEgsNiChE
1OF AUDIT COMMITTEE CHARACTERISTICS ON REAL EARNINGS
MANAGEMENT
Fuad Diponegoro University types of activity manipulation of real activity, namely (1) manipulation of the
sale, (2) a reduction in discretionary costs (general and administrative expenses and cost of sales), and (3)
excessive production (overproducing). Earnings management actions undertaken by management is the
accounting reality that is difficult to accept by the user, can damage the credibility of financial reporting
(Subramanyam and Wild, 2013). The responsibility of the board of commissioners is to act as
representatives of the shareholders in all respects, so the commissioners must supervise the manager to
restrict the activity of the real manipulation. Although the audit committee plays a major role in the regulatory
process of financial reporting, it is unclear whether the audit committee can effectively inhibit the activity of
real earnings management. Research related to the effectiveness of the audit committee have been done,
but until now there are still few empirical evidences that founded about how the characteristics of the audit
committee impact real earnings management. Visvanathan (2008) used data pre-SOX to examine the
relationship between real earnings management and three characteristics of audit committee, specifically
the independence of the audit committee, the audit committee size, and frequency of audit committee
meetings. The results showed that the frequency of audit committee meetings negatively affect the real
income related management discretionary cost reductions, but not for the manipulation of sales activity and
activity overproducting. Mughni (2014) had a research related to the influence of the characteristics of the
audit committee and audit quality on earnings management. The characteristics of the audit committee is
used, which is a measure of the audit committee, financial expertise of audit committee members, the
number of audit committee meetings. The results showed that only financial expertise that have a significant
effect on earnings management. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Agency theory is a theory that describes the relationship between the agent and the principal. On the one
hand manager have a role to be agent and on the other as the principal (owner of the company) (Hendriksen
and Breda, 1992). Agency theory occurs because of a conflict of interest between the principal (owner) and
agent (management). In the agency theory all individuals are assumed to do things just based on their self-
serving. The owners (principals) are assumed to be mainly interested in the acquisition of the yield on the
investment that the owners do on a company. While management (agent) is assumed to receive
compensation that is derived from a monthly compensation and also compensation gained from involvement
in an agency relationship (Anthony and Govindarajan, 2011). This conflict of interest raises the existence of
information asymmetry. Asymmetry of information is an imbalance gained between information of manager
as a provider of information to the shareholders and stakeholders in general as consumers of information.
There are two kinds of information asymmetry, namely: Adverse selection, which is compared with the
shareholders, the management is know more information about the situation and prospects of company.That
condition can cause the information given to the principal does not fully rendered by the agent. Moral
hazard, which is shareholders doesn’t know all the activities doing by the management, so that management
can take action beyond the knowledge of shareholders. Such actions constitute a breach of contract and not
ethically. Implementations of basic earnings management can be explained by the theory agency. Earnings
management occurs because of a conflict of interest between the principal andagents. Management has
more information than shareholder so that it can trigger asymmetric information.Asymmetry information
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involve management to have motivation and strong chance to practice earning management. User of
financial report difficult to accept earning management practice by management. Earning management can
decrease credibility of financial reporting. Schipper (1989) contend that earning management is
management’s interference for determining of company’s profit to gain individual motive. There are several
reasons from management doing earnings management, among which is to raise stock prices by increase
profits, increasing manager compensation, and to get subsidies from the government. Roychowdhury (2006)
comprehensively investigate earnings management through real activities. His research states that the
management usually doing three types of activity manipulation of real activity, namely: Sales Manipulation
Manipulation is defined as the sales manager effort to increase sales during the years for the purpose of
achieving profit targets. Management generates additional sales by offering a limited discount price and by
offering soft credit terms. As a result, sales volume increased and resulted in higher income for the year but
the cash flow decreased due to smaller cash inflows due to credit sales and discounts offered. Reducing
Discretionary Expenses Management can increase profits by reducing discretionary costs. Cost
discretionary companies consist of cost of sales, R & D costs, marketing costs, and general and
administrative expenses. Overproducing Manufacturing companies can carry out large-scale production
(overproducing) is to produce the goods in larger quantities than is needed in order to achieve the expected
demand so that profit will increase. With this excessive production of fixed overhead costs divided by the
number of units of goods in large quantities would bring the
24cost per unit and the cost of goods sold
decreased. The decline on cost of goods sold will result increasing operating margins. Company should
strive to reduce their earning manipulation with doing implementation of good corporate governance. Good
corporate governance achievable with formed an audit committee. The audit committee is a committee
formed by the board of directors in order to help carry out its duties and functions. According Tugiman
(1995) the audit
2committee is a group of people elected by a larger group to do a particular
job or to perform specific tasks or the number of commissioners
of client companies are responsible to assist the auditor in maintaining their independence from
management. Their audit committee is expected to be able to improve the quality of financial reporting
produced by management and is also expected to be able to improve the company's internal control aimed
at giving protection to shareholders. This study examineanything of the characteristics of audit committee
that can reduce the activity of earnings management. Characteristics of the audit committee are
independent variables in this study. Characteristics of the audit committee used that is expertise financial
accounting and
19audit committee members, the size of the audit committee, tenure the
chairman of the audit committee,
28and the number of positions that were held by the chairman of the audit
committee.
The framework in this study, namely: Picture 1.1 Research Framework Hypothesis Development Financial
and AccountingExpertise of Audit Committee Member The first characteristic of audit committee is financial
and accounting expertise of audit committee members. Members with financial and accounting expertise
can enhance the supervisory function owners of the company (the principal) on the management (agent) in
order not to harm the owner of the company.
5Based on the Decree of Chairman of Bapepam Number: Kep- 29 / PM / 2004
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stating that one of the three members of the audit committee must have an educational background in
accounting or finance. Knowledge in the field of accounting and finance can be used as the basis for audit
committee members in their duties.
8Financial and accounting expertise of audit committee members are
expected to reduce a
material misstatement in presenting financial statements so as to reduce the activity of earnings
manipulation by management. Thus, the greater the
20audit committee members with expertise in accounting and finance make
the
quality of financial reporting for the better and secure. Previous research showed
26that the accounting and financial expertise of audit committee
20members can facilitate the audit committee to be more effective in controlling
the
financial reporting process.Bedard et al., (2004) showed that aggressiveness earningmanagementnegatively
affected with accounting and financial expertise of audit committee members. Krishnan and Visvanathan
(2008) found that accounting conservatism is positively related with financial and accounting expertise of
audit committee members. Based on the above explanation, the first hypothesis, that is: H1: Financial and
accounting expertise of
11audit committee members has negative effect on real earnings
management. Audit Committee
Size The second characteristic of
11audit committee is audit committee size. Audit committee size help oversee
the
management (agent) that does not harm the owner (the principal). The larger of the audit committee size
oversight of management (agents) in the conduct of financial reporting becomes more increased.
5Based on the Decree of Chairman of Bapepam Number: Kep- 29 / PM / 2004
which
requires the contents of the audit committee consisting of at least three independent people. The amount of
15audit committees are more likely to have members with expertise varied
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to monitor the practices of financial reporting done by management (agent) is more effective, so that the
owner (principal) was reporting produced have good quality and guaranteed
11(Baxter and Cotter, 2009). Thus, the larger of the audit committee size is
expected to reduce their earning manipulation activities by management.
13Based on the above explanation, the second hypothesis, that is: H2: Audit
committee size negatively affect to the real earnings management.
Tenure Chairman of Audit Committee The third characteristic of audit committee istenure chairmanof audit
committee. Tenure chairmanof audit committeewith a long tenure can improve owner’s company (principal)
supervision toward the management (agent). Chairman of the audit committee with a long tenure has
greater the experience and expertise oversight of financial reporting, so we can easily find misstatements
made by management. The longer tenure chairman of the board can gain relevant knowledge related to
chairman’s job from time to time to improve the performance of their work (Fiedler, 1970 in Sun and Lan
2014). Beasley (1996) found that manipulation of financial statements has possible lower value than the
company had an average longer tenure chairman of the board. Therefore, the chairman of audit committee
with a long tenure is expected to be more effective in overseeing the management compared than
2chairman of the audit committee who has shorter tenure, so that the
resulting financial reporting will be more qualified.
2Based on this explanation, the third hypothesis is:
H3: Tenure chairman of the audit committee negatively affect toward the real earnings management. The
Number of Positions that were be Held by the Chairman of
10Audit Committee The fourth characteristic of audit committee is the number of
positions that were is held by the
19chairman of audit committee. The chairman of audit
committee has double positions outside the company can gain experience and greater expertise in
monitoring managers (Bedard et al., 2004). Another that, the chairman of audit committee may also have a
great reputation to motivate his members so that it can work better (Shivdasani, 1993 in Sun and Lan 2014).
A large number of positions that were be held by the chairman of
13audit committee should be able to reduce earnings management activities
conducted by the
management (agent), so that owner’s company (the principal) can feel confident about the financial reporting
because it has better quality. Bedard et al., (2004) proved
10earnings management is negatively related to the average number of
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positions that were be held by the chairman of audit committee outside the company. The results showed
that the number of positions that were be held by the chairman of audit committee outside the company
more effective to detain the
13earnings management. Based on the above explanation, the fourth
hypothesis is: H4: The
number of positions that were be held by the chairman of audit committee negatively affects toward the real
earnings management. RESEARCH METHODS Population and Sample The population in this research is
manufacturing companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange in period 2012- 2014. The reason for using a
manufacturing company as a population is because the population in the manufacturing sector is more than
other sectors. In addition, the data
5contained in the financial statements on manufacture companies is more
complete and
complex. The data used are the financial statements and annual reports for three years from 2012 to 2014.
The reason for using the data for 2012-2014 is because the data year 2012-2014 provide an overview of
Supriyaningsih Fuad Diponegoro University the current condition of the company which is the latest data of
the company. The sampling technique used in this research is purposive sampling, is a technique commonly
used in the sampling process based on certain criteria predetermined. The criteria were used: (1) Company
listed on the Stock Exchange and issued financial statements and annual reports in a row and complete for
the period ended December 31, 2012 to 2014; (2) manufacturing company issued financial statements using
the currency of rupiah; and (3) the company used as a sample is a company with full information relating to
the calculation indicators and variables used in this study. Table 1 Purposive Sampling Explanation Amount
Manufacturing companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange in period 2012-2014 Companies that do not
meet the criteria Companies thatmeet the criteria Outlier 688 (544) 144 (33) Total samples within 3 years 111
Source : Secondary data were processed, 2016 Measurement of Real Earnings Management
8This study uses real earnings management as the dependent variable. Real
earnings management is
earnings manipulation by using the operations that directly impact on cash flow. Based on previous
research, measurement of real earnings management in this study uses the calculation concept of
Royhowdhury (2006) which uses three approaches, specifically: the abnormal production cost caused by
manipulation of the manufacturing process, the abnormal operating cash flow caused by manipulation of
sales activity, and discretionary expenses caused by the manipulation of operating expenses. The first step
is calculating the cost of normal production (PROD),discretionary expense (DISX), and operating cash flow
(CFO) following the results of the regression for each company. The second step is calculating the normal
rate on PROD, CFO, and DISX separately. The concept for the calculation of the normal level of production
costs (PROD), normal levels of operating cash flow (CFO), and normal levels of discretionary expense
(DISX), are: Normal Level of Production Costs (PROD)
18〖PROD〗_t/A_(t-1) □(= α_(0 ) )+ β _(1 ) 1/A_(t-1) + β _(2 ) S_t/A_(t-1) + β _(3 )
〖∆S 〗_t/A_(t-1) + β _(4 ) 〖∆S 〗_(t-1)/A_(t-1) + which: A _(t-
1) = total asset inyear t-1 S_t = Net sales
14in year t 〖∆S〗_t = variance of net sales from year t-1 to t
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〖PROD〗_t= production cost in year t α_0 = Constanta β_(1-4) = Coefisien ε = error Normal Level of
Operating Cash Flow (CFO)
12〖CFO〗_t/A_(t-1) □(= α_(0 ) )+ β _(1 ) 1/A_(t-1) + β_(2 ) S_t/A_(t-1) + β_(3 )
〖∆S〗_t/A_(t-1) + ε _t
Dimana: CFOt = operating cash flow in year t DISXt = discretionary expense in yeart (selling expense,
general and administrative expense) The third step is calculating the abnormal PROD (APROD), abnormal
CFO (ACFO), and abnormal DISX (ADISX). Abnormal value
19is calculated by subtracting the actual value with the predicted abnormal value
(Cohen et al., 2008). The concept of the calculation is as follows: Abnormal Level of Cost Production
〖APROD〗_t =
25〖PROD〗 _t/A_(t-1) □(- ) [β _(1 ) 1 /A_(t-1) + β_( 2 ) S _t/A_(t-1) + β_( 3 ) 〖∆S
〗_t/A_(t-1) + β_( 4 ) 〖∆S 〗_(t-1)/A_(t-1) ] Which: 〖APROD 〗_t=
Abnormal Level of Cost Production in year t Abnormal Level of Operating Cash Flow Normal Level of
Discretionary 〖ACFO〗_t = 〖CFO〗_t/A_(t-1) Expense (DISX) □( - ) [β_(1 ) 1/A_(t-1) + β_(2 ) S_t/A_(t-
〖DISX〗_t/A_(t-1) □(= α_(0 ) )+ 1) + β_(3 ) 〖∆S〗_t/A_(t-1) ] β_(1 ) 1/A_(t-1) + β_(2 ) S_(t-1)/A_(t- Which:
1) + ε_t 〖ACFO〗_t =abnormallevel of Which: operating cash flow in year t 70
TSHupEriINyaFnLiUnEgNsiChE OF
6AUDIT COMMITTEE CHARACTERISTICS ON REAL EARNINGS
MANAGEMENT AbnormalLevel of Discretionary Expense A〖
DISX〗_t = 〖DISX〗_t/A_(t- 1) □( - ) [β_(1 ) 1/A_(t-1) + β_(2 ) S_(t- 1)/A_(t-1) ] Which: A〖DISX〗_t
=abnormal level of discretionary expense in year t Companies that seek to manipulate earnings tend to have
higher APROD, while ACFO and ADISX lower.The final step is combining three sizes of real earnings
manipulation into a proxy named RM. The concept of the calculation is as follows: 〖RM〗_t =
□(〖APROD〗_t- 〖 ACFO〗_t-〖ADISX〗_t ) which: 〖RM〗_t = Real earning management in year t
Analysis Method Hypothesis testing used multiple linear regression analysis (multiple regression). Multiple
linear regression analysis aimed to test hypothesis whether there is influence between the independent
variable on the dependent variable. In general, multiple linear regression analysis model
23can be written as follows: │RMt │=α+β_1 ACEXPt +β_2 ACSIZEt +β_3 ACTENt
+β_4 ACOTHt +β_5 ROAt +β_6 SIZEt +β_
6 MBt+ ε_(i,t) which: RMt : real earning management α : constanta β_(1-6) : coefisien ACEXPt : Financial
and accounting expertise of audit committee members, as measured by number of members who have
expertise or experience in the field of accounting and finance. ACSIZEt :
15Audit committee size, measured by the number of audit committee
members
that exist in every company. ACTENt : Tenure chairmanof the audit committee, as measured by the number
of tenure of the chairman of the audit committee since the first appointment until the period of the study
ACOTHt : The number of positions that were
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7held by the chairman of the audit committee, measured by the number of
positions that are concurrently chairman of the audit committee, both within and outside the company. SIZEt
: The size of the company, based on the natural logarithm of market value. ROAt : Return on asset MBt :
Market-to-book ratio members (ACEXPt) minimum value is 1.0 and a maximum value is 3.0 with an average
value is 2.261. This suggests that most companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in the year 2012-
2014 has been implement the requirement of the Capital Market Supervisory Agency and Financial
According to Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008), accounting expertise and financial shared by members of
the audit committee can be interpreted as directors who are or who have been included in one of the
members of the following groups: graduates from accounting, auditor, certified public accountant (CPA),
principal or chief financial officers (CFO), controller, and principal or chief accounting officers (CAO).
Institution (BAPEPAM LK), that is at least 1 member who has accounting and financial expertise.The
standard deviation is 0.747 indicates a variation contained in the audit committee financial accounting
expertise. For the variable size of the audit committee (ACSIZEt) minimum value is 3
17.0 and a maximum value is 4.0 with an average value
is 3.063. This suggests that most manufacturing companies have implementation requirements of the
5Capital Market Supervisory Agency and Financial Institution (BAPEPAM LK)
is a minimum RESULTS AND DISCUSSION Table 2 shows the results of descriptive statistic tests. The
results showed that the number of samples (N) is 111. The maximum value for the variable of real earnings
management (RMt) is1.242, while the minimum value is 0.004. The average value is 0.346. Standard
deviation of real earnings management variable is 0.256 can shows the variation of the value of inter-
company from year to year. For variable accounting and financial expertise on audit committee have 3
members of audit committee. The standard deviation is 0.244 indicates a variation contained in the variable
size of the audit committee. For variable tenure chairman of the audit committee (ACTENt)
17minimum value is 0.0 and a maximum value is 13 .0. The average value
is 5.243 that are shows the majority of the company's audit committee chairman on manufacture serves
more than one period. The standard deviation is 4.110 indicates a variation contained in this variable.
TSHupEriINyaFnLiUnEgNsiChE OF
6AUDIT COMMITTEE CHARACTERISTICS ON REAL EARNINGS
MANAGEMENT For a variable number of
positions that were be held by the chairman of the audit committee (ACOTHt)
17minimum value is 0.0 and a maximum value is 4.0 with an average value
is 1.532. This indicates that a portion the chairman of the audit committee have another positions both within
the company and outside the company. The standard deviation is 0.922 indicates the variation contained in
this variable. Table 2 Descriptif Statistic Test Result Variabel N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
REM 111 0,004 1,242 0,346 0,256 ACEXP 111 1,0 3,0 2,261 0,747 ACSIZE 111 3,0 4,0 3,063 0,244 ACTEN
111 0,0 13,0 5,243 4,110 ACOTH 111 0,0 4,0 1,532 0,922 ROA 111 -0,170 0,350 0,079 0,096 SIZE 111
4,143 10,165 7,098 1,541 MB 111 -2,695 52,394 3,688 6,563 Source : Secondary data were processed,
2016; REM:Real earnings management; ACEXP: Financial accounting expertise of audit committee
members; ACSIZE:Audit committee size; ACTEN: Tenure chairman of the audit committee; ACOTH
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28:The number of positions that were held by the chairman of the audit
committee;
ROA: Return on asset;SIZE:The size of the company; MB: Market-to-book ratio Table3 shows the results of
Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for each independent variable to test multicollinearity between each
independent variable. The results shows each independent variable has a value of VIF is less than 10.
Based on these results it can be concluded that there is no multicollinearity of each independent variable.
Table 3 also shows the test of hypothesis in this research. The following are the results of testing hypothesis
were made: Influence of
22Financial and Accounting Expertise of Audit Committee Members toward
the
Real Earnings Management From the test results have shown the value of the variable probability of
financial accounting expertise of audit committee members is smaller than the 0.05 level that is equal to
0.019 (0.019 <0.05). This means
21that the variable financial accounting expertise of audit committee members
significantly affect the real
8earnings management. However, the direction coefficient indicates
a positive direction. The results of this test mean that the financial accounting expertise of audit committee
members to make real earnings management increases. Thus hypothesis 1 which states that “financialand
accounting
26expertise of audit committee members negatively affect the real earnings
management"
is rejected.
5Based on the Decree of Chairman of Bapepam Number: Kep- 29 / PM / 2004
states that have at least one member with expertise in accounting and finance. Although most
12of the companies listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange has followed the
rules has not yet been able to reduce their earnings management. The results can be seen by the average
value for the variable financial accounting expertise (ACEXPt) of 2.261. The value of the average shows that
most companies
20have members with expertise in accounting and finance
more than one person. The large number of members with expertise in the financial and accounting rather
than reducing earningsmanagement, but instead make more practice earningsmanagement in the
company's. This can be due to the
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8audit committee members who do not have an educational background in
accounting or finance
considered to have the ability
16in the field of accounting and finance when to be a member of the audit
committee.
In addition, the appointment of independent directors to be the chairman of the audit committee
independence is questionable. Problems independence and expertise in accounting and finance may cause
the audit committee is more likely to side with management when there is disagreement between
management and the external auditor. Therefore, earnings management conducted by the management
because support from the audit committee. This condition may cause financial accounting
21expertise of audit committee members have positive influence on earnings
management
of real (Sanjaya, 2008 in Ariyani 2011). Influence of Audit Committee Size toward Real Earnings
Management From the test results have shown the value of the variable probability of audit committee size
is smaller than the significant level of 0.05, which is equal to 0.000 (0.000 <0.05). This means that the
variable audit committee size significantly affect the real earnings management. However, the direction
coefficient of the audit committee size showed a positive direction. The results of this test mean that the
audit committee size make real earnings management increases. Therefore, hypothesis 2 which states that
"the audit committee size negatively affect the real earnings management" is rejected. Based on the Decree
of Chairman of Bapepam Number: Kep-29 / PM / 2004 stated that the establishment of an audit THE
INFLUENCE OF AUDIT COMMITTEE CHARACTERISTICS ON REAL EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
Supriyaningsih Fuad Diponegoro University committee must have at least three members. Although the
average company is already implementing these rules, it still has not been able to reduce their real earnings
management activities. The results showed that the audit committee size would increase the occurrence of
earnings management. It can be caused due to the small number of audit committee members. The number
of members is too little can cause problems due to the lack of division of duties of members (Klein, 2012).
This leads to make supervision toward management when financial reporting processes less qualified, this
condition allows management doing fraud. This condition may cause the audit committee size is a positive
influence on real earnings management. Influence of Tenure Chairmanof the Audit Committee toward Real
Earnings Management From the test results have shown the value of the variable probability tenure
chairman of the audit committee is greater than the significant level of 0.05, which amounted to 0.772
(0.722> 0.05). This means that the variable tenure of
24audit committee chairman does not affect the real earnings management.
Therefore hypothesis 3 which states that "the tenure of audit committee chairman negatively affect the real
earnings management" has been rejected. The long duration appointment chairman of the audit committee
is apparently not affecting the earnings management. This can be due to a decline in the performance
chairman of the audit committee. This performance degradation can be caused by the chairman of the audit
committee has to know about the company's condition, so that the chairman of the audit committee have felt
no need to work hard again to oversee the management. The action taken by the chairman of the audit
committee could lead to other audit committee members to do the same. It can create an audit committee is
no longer effective when oversee management to the financial reporting process. This condition may lead to
tenure chairman
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6of the audit committee has no effect on earnings management. Influence of
Number of
Positions that were be
7held by the Chairman of the Audit Committee toward the
26Real Earnings Management From the test results have shown a probability
value of
a variable number of positions that were
7held by the chairman of the audit committee is smaller than the significant level
of
0.05, which amounted to 0.045 (0.045 <0.05). This means that a variable number of positions that were
7held by the chairman of the audit committee significantly affect the
24real earnings management. In addition, the direction coefficient of the size of
the
audit committee showed a negative direction. The results of this test mean that the number of positions that
were held by the chairman of the audit committee makes real earnings management is reduced. Therefore
hypothesis 4 which states that "the number of positions that were held by the chairman of the audit
committee negatively affect the real earnings management" are accepted. Based on the average value for a
variable number of positions that were
7held by the chairman of the audit committee (ACOTHt) that is
equal to 1.532 with a maximum value is 4.0 and a minimum value is 0.0
16indicates that the majority of the chairman of the audit committee
has more than one position. A large number of positions that were held by the chairman of the audit
committee were effective for reducing their earnings manipulation carried out by the management. A large
number of positions that were held by the chairman of the audit committee are made chairman of the audit
committee more experienced as it faces a different situation for every company where he worked. With the
experience, of course, that isenhancing the knowledge and
16expertise of the chairman of the audit committee. Increasing the expertise and
experience is
the basis
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6for the chairman of the audit committee to motivate members
to work better. With so many positions that were held by the chairman
15of the audit committee, pointed out that the chairman of the audit committee
also has a good reputation, so of course
6the chairman of the audit committee will give a
maximum contribution to the company. Therefore, oversight toward management will increase and reduce
manipulation practice by management. Table 4 Hypothesis Test Result Variables B t Variance Inflation
Factor (Constant) ACEXPt ACSIZEt ACTENt ACOTHt ROAt SIZEt MBt -0,898 0,061 0,328 0,001 -0,040
1,732 -0,002 0,009 -3,760 2,378** 4,212* 0,291 -2,033** 8,136* -0,154 3,080* 1,311 1,272 1,183 1,134
1,478 1,711 1,259 THE
1INFLUENCE OF AUDIT COMMITTEE CHARACTERISTICS ON REAL
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
Supriyaningsih Fuad Diponegoro University Source : Secondary data were processed, 2016; *: significant at
level 0,01; **: significant at level 0,05; Real earnings management: dependent variable; ACEXP: Financial
accounting expertise of audit committee members; ACSIZE: Audit committee size; ACTEN: Tenure chairman
of the audit committee; ACOTH:
28The number of positions that were held by the chairman of the audit committee;
ROA: Return on asset;SIZE: The size of the company; MB: Market-to-book ratio CONCLUSION The
purpose of this study is to examine the influence of the characteristics of the audit committee toward real
earnings management. This is their conclusion based on the analysis of data that has been described in
previous chapters: 1. The first characteristic ofaudit committee, that is
22financial and accounting expertise of audit committee members. The
results show the financial and accounting
21expertise of audit committee members has significant positive effect on real
earnings management. 2. The
second characteristic of audit committee, thatis audit committee size. The results showed that the audit
committee size has significant positive effect on real earnings management. 3. The third characteristics of
audit committee that isthe audit committee tenure. The results showed that the tenure of the audit committee
11has no significant effect on real earnings management. 4. The fourth
characteristic of
audit committee, which is the number of positions that were held by the chairman of the audit committee.
The results showed that the number of positions that were be held by the chairman of the
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23audit committee has significant negative effect on the real earnings
management.
Research conducted has weakness and limitations that reduce the perfection of research results. The next
research is expected to pay attention to the limitations of this study. Limitations of this study are: 1. Many
companies do not attach the complete information related to the audit committee in the annual report, so it
cannot be sampled. 2. The sample of companies used as a research object only manufacturing company, so
it has not been able to include results for all companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange. 3. The
result has not been able to provide empirical evidence toward tenure the chief of audit committee variable.
Future studies are expected to present the results of a higher quality and accurate by watching that is some
suggestion: 1. Future studies may use different sample other than manufacturing companies, such as
financial companies and banks due to the financial sector has different characteristics with the company on
manufacture. 2. The next research can add variables to the
2characteristics of the audit committee, such as the frequency of audit
committee meetings, the independence of the audit committee, and
so on. This is because there are many variables that can be
6used to explain the relationship of audit committee characteristics and
earnings management.
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